We consider here the evaluation of the performance of a society with respect to a given set of targets. We provide a characterization of an intuitive evaluation formula that consists of the mean of the shares of the achievements in the targets. The criterion so obtained permits one not only to endogenously determine who meets the standards and who does not, but also to quantify the degree of fulfilment. Two empirical illustrations are provided: the compliance of the European Union Stability and Growth Pact, on the one hand, and the evaluation of research excellence in the Spanish universities, on the other hand.
Introduction
Consider an organization consisting of several units whose performance is to be evaluated with respect to a vector of targets or reference values previously set. Depending on the problem under consideration, those targets may represent absolute values, relative performance thresholds, or a mixture of them. We can think that the purpose of the evaluation is the allocation of some resources among those who qualify and/or prestige or recognition. The evaluation procedure itself may be conceived as a simple dichotomous criterion concerning the achievement of the targets, it may attempt at providing quantitative estimates of the overall degree of fulfilment, or something in between (e.g. classification in different categories).
We shall refer to the organization as a society and to the incumbent units as agents. The key feature of the problem is the existence of a society with many agents whose performance is to be evaluated with respect to a given set of multidimensional targets, to be called standards. Note that in some cases meeting the standards may imply getting values below the thresholds.
Deciding who meets the standards in a multidimensional scenario is not immediate. Two extreme positions can be considered. On the one hand, there is the most demanding interpretation by which meeting the standards means achieving all target values simultaneously. On the other hand, there is the other extreme interpretation according to which achieving some target is a sufficient criterion. Each of those polar views makes the decision on who meets the standards rather trivial. The drawback is that in both cases we may find very unfair outcomes, as we can be treating equally highly different performances. The difficult problem is, of course, how to handle the intermediate cases. That is, when agents in society exceed some of the prescribed targets but fail to reach some others (a relevant case in practice and a usual source of conflicts). The bottom line is whether we admit or not compensations among achievements, both across dimensions and across agents, and what kind of compensations should be considered (we shall refer to this feature as the substitutability problem).
Let us consider two cases that illustrate well the key features of this type of evaluation problem. Those examples illustrate two specific cases of the evaluation problem under consideration. In both examples the evaluation may require not only identifying those who meet the standards, but also to estimate their degree of success. In Example 1 the standards are fixed externally whereas in Example 2 the standards are relative to the actual performance. Therefore, we can also consider the question of whether some specific objectives have been reached in Example 1, whereas this type of question is meaningless in Example 2. Also observe that meeting the standards in Example 1 means having values of the index below the thresholds, whereas in Example 2 it means values above the thresholds.
Example 1: The European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The SGP is an agreement among the 16 members of the European Union that take part in the Eurozone, to facilitate and maintain the stability of the Economic and Monetary Union. It involves setting reference values for some key public finance variables and aims at enforcing fiscal discipline after the monetary union (member states adopting the euro have to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria, and the SGP ensures that they continue to observe them). The basic reference values are two: (a) An annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of GDP; (b)
This type of problem can be regarded as a case of multicriterion decision making (e.g. [1] and [2] ). The proposed solutions may be interpreted as a class of compromise solutions on specific domains that evaluate the achievements in terms of some distance function (see, for instance, [3] and [4] ). Our approach, however, stems from the principles that are applied for the analysis of development, inequality and poverty. Roughly speaking development measures allow to estimate the achievements, the targets play a similar role to the poverty thresholds, and inequality enters the picture as measuring the degree of substitutability among the achievements. See [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic model. We present there the key assumptions and the essential ideas of this contribution by means of a simple and intuitive evaluation function: an arithmetic mean of the shares of the achievements in the targets. The axioms we use for that are rather standard: weighted anonymity (any two agents with the same weight and the same realizations are indistinguishable), weighted neutrality (all dimensions that enter with the same weight are equally important), a normalization property, and additive monotonicity (an increase in the realizations entails an increase in the evaluation function that depends positively on the size of that increment). Section 3 introduces a more flexible evaluation model, allowing for different degrees of substitutability between agents and dimensions, by characterizing the uniparametric family of generalized means. Section 4 contains an empirical illustration of this approach by analyzing the two examples presented above: the performance of the countries in the Eurozone, regarding the EU Stability and Growth Pact, and the selection of the set of excellent Spanish universities from a research viewpoint. A few final comments are gathered in Section 5. 
The Basic Model
Next property, normalization, makes the value of the index equal to zero when Y  0 (the null matrix) and equal to
is the matrix whose columns repeat the target vector for each agent). 1 Formally:
Normalization:
Our last property, additive monotonicity, establishes conditions on the behaviour of the evaluation function when the matrix of the agents' achievements changes from to , for some . The property requires the change of the index to be a monotone function
in the realization matrix. This is a very natural property that is most useful when the data on the agents' performance is collected from several sources, or across different time periods, or when there are mistakes to be corrected. The new data can be integrated by simply computing the value of that function Y  g regarding those new data and adding up the result to the original value of the index. Formally:
Additive Monotonicity: Let and let . Then,
 
, , ,
for some increasing function . : g    Note that this requirement is cardinal in nature and involves a separability feature of the overall index. Indeed, it implies that increasing the achievement of an agent in a given dimension by one unit will have the same impact on the index, no matter the level at which this happens (perfect substitutability of weighted agents and weighted dimensions). 
Remark It is easy to see that additive monotonicity and normalization together imply additivity, that is,
The following result shows that all those requirements yield an evaluation function that corresponds to the arithmetic mean of the weighted shares of the achievements in the targets. Formally: 
Moreover, those properties are independent. Proof 1) The function in (1) 
Therefore, we can write: 
Now observe that our assumptions imply that  is linearly homogeneous, that is,
for all 0   . Let now be given by:
This simply extends the idea that the index is equal to one when Y = Z and all agents and all targets are equally important, i.e.
this function inherits the linear homogeneity property and satisfies normalization, by taking and
Therefore, plugging those values into Equation (2), for all , we get:
2) To separate the properties let us consider the following indices, for 1
. It satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and additive monotonicity but not normalization.
. It satisfies anonymity, neutrality, and normalization but not additive monotonicity.
for some i . It satisfies neutrality, normalization, and additive monotonicity but not anonymity. This theorem tells us that assuming weighted anonymity, weighted neutrality, normalization, and additive monotonicity amounts to measuring social performance as the (weighted) arithmetic mean of the agents' relative achievements.
It is interesting to observe that equation (2) we have the weighted sum of the ij j y z values. Similarly, we can have a measure of the overall success of society in a given dimension, as:
The Agents Who Meet the Standards and the Targets that Have Been Reached
Let us consider now the question of who meets the standards and whether we can consider that a given target has been collectively achieved. In our model those problems are solved endogenously by the very formula that measures the overall performance. In order to facilitate the exposition, we focus on the case in which meeting the standards means achieving values above the established thresholds. In that case, an agent with , for all , certainly meets the standards. 
describes a matrix whose th row is precisely ). Therefore, the set M(P) of agents who meet the standards in problem is given by:
(note that we allow for the existence of agents in M(P) whose achievements are below the target in some dimension, provided they are compensated with over compliance in other dimensions). Equation (6) permits one to directly identify the set of those who meet the standards in the -dimensional space in which we plot on all agents' vectors of
3 Note that computing the success in a given dimension makes sense when the thresholds are externally given and may not be meaningful when they correspond to functions of the actual values of the realization matrix.
relative achievements,
is given by all those agents whose vectors of relative achievements are above the hyperplane defined by
When the reference values
 are externally given (i.e. they correspond absolute thresholds), we can also consider whether a specific objective has been reached by society. According to equation [5] , objective is achieved provided:
describes a matrix whose th column is equal to j j z in all entries. Therefore, the set of objectives that have been collectively achieved are those that satisfy the following condition:
A More Flexible Formlation
The additive structure of the evaluation function  in Theorem 1 implies a particular trade-off between the different achievements, as the evaluation only depends on the sum of the agent's relative realizations but not on their distribution. So each agent can substitute any relative realization for another one at a constant rate (equal to , j t    for all ) no matter the level at which this happens. Similarly, the relative achievements of one agent in a given dimension can be substituted by those of another one, once more at a constant rate (here we find a marginal rate of substitution equal to
). , i h N  One might be willing to consider evaluation criteria that incorporate variable degrees of substitutability (e.g. decreasing marginal rates of substitution which implies penalizing the inequality of realizations across agents and/or dimensions, which may actually be a reason to introduce such a criterion). The simplest way of allowing for variable substitutability across agents and dimensions is by looking for a uniparametric extension of the formula in Theorem 1, so that controlling a single number permits one to regulate the degree of substitutability. To arrive at such a formula, let us start by performing the following exercise. Let  
, , , Note that we require for all entries of matrix , in order to avoid inconsistencies. We therefore, set 
This property mimics the principle applied by the variance to the measurement of differences to the mean.
If we take the power  of all relevant parameters of the problem, then we re-scale the resulting formula by taking the inverse power.
The following result is trivially obtained: 
Moreover, those properties are independent. Theorem 2 identifies the generalized mean of order  as the right formula to evaluate the performance of the society, where  is the parameter that incorporates our concern for equality across agents and dimensions (or the degree of substitutability).
Remark Theorem 1 is not a particular case of Theorem 2 because the domain on which the evaluation function is defined is different.
 , be a problem with strictly positive (i.e. for all ) and consider the transformation by all agents whose vectors of weighted relative realizations, , are above (resp. below) the hyper-surface defined by:
Therefore, choosing  (the elasticity of substitution) amounts to fix the bonus/malus frontier. In particular,    (resp.    ) corresponds to the extreme case in which an agent meets the standards when she is above the targets in all dimensions simultaneously (resp. above some target); that is, the max (resp. the min) function. As for the intermediate cases, we find two of special relevance: the arithmetic mean, associated to the value 1   , discussed in the former section, and the geometric mean, associated to the value 0   . A similar reasoning applies to the case of achieving some target, with respect to the hyper-surface
From a different viewpoint the parameter  may be regarded as an equality coefficient in the following sense:
the smaller the value of  the more weight we attach to a more egalitarian distribution of the agents' achievements, both among themselves and with respect to the different dimensions. The case 1   shows no concern for the distribution, as only the sum of the achievements matters (inequality neutrality). Values of  smaller than one correspond to inequality aversion. The geometric mean, in particular, penalizes moderately the unequal distribution of the achievements, whereas the extreme case    (resp.    ) implies caring only about the smallest (resp. the highest) achievement of each agent. This can be illustrated as follows. Take the evaluation function of a given agent,
The parameter  controls de degree of substitutability among the different dimensions on an indifference curve, i
. The smaller the value of
the more difficult to substitute the achievement in one dimension by that in another. In the limit, no substitution is allowed so that meeting the standards implies surpassing all target levels. Similarly, assuming that the reference values correspond to absolute thresholds externally given, the evaluation of the global performance with respect to a given target, , is given by:
The parameter  n value tells us now about the substitutability between i dividuals within a given d The higher the of imension.
 the easier to substitute the achievem e i pplication of our model to the resented in Examples 1 s that all member states of the Euroent of on ndividual by the achievement of another and viceversa.
Empirical Illustrations
Let us consider the a evaluation of the two problems p and 2 in Section 1.
The European Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)
The SGP establishe zone have to satisfy the following two requirements: (a) An annual budget deficit no higher than 3% of the GDP; (b) A national debt lower than 60% of the GDP. Let us take those values as the thresholds applicable to evaluate the performance of the states in the Eurozone, ignoring all implementation issues and the re-interpretations and refinements introduced later. Table 1 provides the data on budget deficit and national debt for the 16 countries in the Eurozone, between 2006 and 2009. The question is to determine which countries do satisfy those criteria and which do not (note that here meeting the standards means producing outcomes which are below the thresholds). Table 1 suggests several ways of interpreting the evaluation problem. On the one hand, we may consider that satisfying the performance criteria means meeting the standards every single year. In that case we would have four separate evaluation problems. On the other hand, one may also consider the evaluation for the whole period, as the performance of the countries is affected by the economic cycle. In that case we treat deficits and debt data corresponding to different years as if they were different variables.
5 Table 2 provides the summary data of the countries' performance under the two evaluation approaches. The set of agents meeting the standards is given by:
Therefore, we present the data in Table 2 by showing in each cell the value 1
, so that we can easily id , 2008 and r columns), debt on the whole period (last two columns).
entify those who meet the standards. rds year bourg b F nland. There are 7 more countries that satisfy the criteria when considering the whole period: Germany, Spain, Cyprus, Netherlands, Austria, Slovenia and Slovakia. And there are two countries that do not meet the standards in any of the years considered: Greece and Italy.
Let us now consider whether the Stability and Growth Pact has been fulfilled collectively along the years analyzed in Tables 1 and 2 . To do so we let the weight i  of each country be given by its relative GDP. We observe that, taking the two objectives together there is only one year in which the Eurozone did not satisfy the criteria of the SGP (last row of Table 2 ). Yet the deviation was bad enough as to conclude that for the whole Eurozone and the whole period, the pact has not been fulfilled (as   . 1.01
 
). Looking at each objective individually, we observe that the Eurozone has collectively reached the deficit target (nine countries did it individually) but has f tisfy the debt target (even though eight countries met that objective). All together the Eurozone has failed to meet the standards, even though nine of the countries have succeeded in doing it.
Research Excelence in the Spanish
Universities ailed to sa ellence data reorted paper analyzes the performance of ntile 8 hin each ory. As weigh the bles we re-scale those in the study that im ollowin
We now consider the evaluation of research exc in the Spanish public universities, out of the in [11] . This p the Spanish universities and provides an overall ranking using a set of variables whose relative weights are determined by the opinion of researchers obtained by a specific survey. Values are relative to the size of the permanent faculty in each university and are normalized so that the top university in each dimension gets a mark of 100. 6 Here we take three out of the six variables computed by those authors, as we understand they are the most relevant ones. These variables are: publications (in terms of ISI papers), individual research productivity achievements, IRPA for short, 7 and success in getting research funds competitively. In order to define "excellence" we take a relative vector of reference values given by: Table 3 es the data corresponding to the 48 Spanish univer lyzed. The object of this exercise is to determine the set of universities that are "excellent" from the point of view of their research realizations in 2009. 8 does not add new universitie hat set. Finally, for the other extreme value, s to t    (namely, the set of universities that satisfy at least one of those criteria), we find that the set of excellent universities includes five more: Alcalá, Girona, Lleida, Rey Juan Carlos, and Valencia. Table 4 gives the data of the 8 universities that meet the excellence standard the geometric and/or the arithmetic mean. The table contains their relative arithmetic mean scores, information about the region in which those universities are placed, and whe-ther they are new (created in the last twenty years, say), modern (c s using reated in the 60's) or traditional (with a history of hundreds of years). Even though discussing those data is not the purpose of this exercise, it is quite noticeable the success of the Catalan universities and the dominance of new and modern universities over the traditional ones.
Final Comments
We have provided here a criterion to evaluate the performance of a society with respect to a collection of targets. This criterion materializes in a simple an intuitive ormula, a mean of order f  of the shares of the realizah has be ized by ents. The the mean tions in the targets, whic eans of standard requirem en character order of m is a parameter that determines the substitutability between the achievements and therefore the admissible degree of compensation among the various dimensions and the different agents. From this perspective the model can be regarded as producing endogenously a system of shadow prices that permits one to aggregate the different ce (c) It allows handling both positive and negative values of the variables.
(d) It fits well in those cases in which it is not clear whether one s at values of  smaller than 1 penalize progressively the dispersion of the achievements whereas values of  greater than 1 do the contrary. So choosing  above or below unity amounts to promoting the differentiation of the agents' perf rmance (specialization) or the homogeneous behaviour (uniformity). The linear case represen preference neutrality regarding pooling or separating behaviour.
Needless to say there are contexts in which values 1 o ts   will be more suitable (e.g. when meeting the standards involves safety issues or when similar behaviour is preferable).
ity in agents will typically be related to the numbe vidual outcomes may be partially interdependent. A n point is tha ich agents in society constitute a ork (thin ance of the eval esearch ms). In tha the weights may ciated to some measure of centrality, as in [12] and [13] . We have introduced the notions of weighted anonymorder to deal with agents of different size or importance, and with targets of different relevance. The "size" of the r of units within each agent (or the absolute value of their realizations, as in the Stability and Growth Pact, discussed above). We can also think of a more complex determination of those weights, in particular when indiThe presence of targets of different relevance is also common in many problems (e.g. weighting progressively less the past realizations when evaluating the outcomes along a given period of time). A different problem is that of handling targets with different degrees of priority, that is, targets that admit different degrees of substitutability (e.g. a group of targets have to be fulfilled before any other group is taken into account). The analysis of that case is left for future research. case i t in wh netw k for inst uation of r tea t case be asso
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